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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______________
No. 20-2102
______________
GUY C. PATTERSON,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-18-cv-00193)
District Court Judge: Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose
______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
January 29, 2021
______________
Before: MATEY and JORDAN, Circuit Judges, BOLTON *, Senior District Judge.
(Filed: February 5, 2021)
______________
OPINION **

______________

*

The Honorable Susan Bolton, Senior United States District Judge for the District
of Arizona, sitting by designation.
**

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.

BOLTON, Senior District Judge.
We consider the claims of Guy C. Patterson, a 55-year-old white male, against the
Social Security Administration (“Agency”) alleging that, by failing to select him for three
job openings, the Agency: (1) discriminated against him on the basis of his sex, race, and
age, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the federal-sector
provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”); and (2) took
retaliatory action against him in violation of Title VII and the ADEA. Patterson filed his
lawsuit in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The District Court
granted the Agency’s motion for summary judgment and denied Patterson’s cross-motion
for summary judgment on all claims. It also denied Patterson’s subsequent motion to
alter or amend this judgment. Patterson timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant
to 29 U.S.C. § 1291.
I.

DISCUSSION
Patterson’s claims fail as a matter of law. “We exercise plenary review over a

district court’s [order entered on motions for] summary judgment, and we apply the same
standard as the district court.” Bletz v. Corrie, 974 F.3d 306, 308 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation
omitted). “Summary judgment is appropriate where, construing all evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Applying those standards, we conclude that the record
supports the District Court’s judgment that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law
to prove any of Patterson’s claims. Patterson argues that a recent Supreme Court case,
2

Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168, 1177 (2020), changes this result, but fails to offer
evidence that meets even Babb’s lower causation standard. Babb, 140 S. Ct. at 1177-78
(but-for causation not required to establish liability for violation of ADEA’s federalsector provision). 1
Patterson cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of Title
VII or the ADEA because he has insufficient evidence of discriminatory intent. See
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (burden-shifting
framework requires plaintiff to establish prima facie case); Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that a prima facie case of employment
discrimination “requires a showing that: (1) the plaintiff belongs to a protected class; (2)
he/she was qualified for the position; (3) he/she was subject to an adverse employment
action despite being qualified; and (4) under circumstances that raise an inference of
discriminatory action, the employer continued to seek out individuals with qualifications
similar to the plaintiff's to fill the position”). Even if he could make such a showing, the
Agency has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not selecting Patterson
for each position, including lower interview scores. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411
U.S. at 802 (burden-shifting framework requires employer to articulate legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment action). Patterson’s evidence is

1

Patterson also raises the following issues: The District Court erred in failing to
consider the applicability of Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) to his claims, and
the Agency failed to comply with an Office of Personnel Management regulation, which
Patterson argues is material to his employment discrimination claims. We find none of
these arguments have merit.
3

insufficient to show that any of these reasons were pretextual. See id. at 804 (burdenshifting framework permits plaintiff opportunity to show pretext).
Patterson also fails to produce evidence sufficient to establish a causal connection
between his non-selection and retaliatory animus. See Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461
F.3d 331, 340–41 (3d Cir. 2006) (“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation . . . a
plaintiff must tender evidence that: (1) [he] engaged in protected activity . . . ; (2) “the
employer took an adverse employment action against [him]; and (3) there was a causal
connection between [his] participation in the protected activity and the adverse
employment action.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The District Court correctly granted summary judgment on all claims.
II.

CONCLUSION
Because Patterson’s evidence cannot prove his claims, we will affirm.
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